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Natural language—spoken and signed—is a multichannel phenomenon,
involving facial and body expression, and voice and visual intonation that is
often used in the service of a social urge to communicate meaning. Given
that iconicity seems easier and less abstract than making arbitrary connections
between sound and meaning, iconicity and gesture have often been invoked in
the origin of language alongside the urge to convey meaning. To get a fresh
perspective, we critically distinguish the origin of a system capable of evolution
from the subsequent evolution that system becomes capable of. Human
language arose on a substrate of a system already capable of Darwinian evol-
ution; the genetically supported uniquely human ability to learn a language
reflects a key contact point between Darwinian evolution and language.
Though implemented in brains generated by DNA symbols coding for protein
meaning, the second higher-level symbol-using system of language now oper-
ates in a world mostly decoupled from Darwinian evolutionary constraints.
Examination of Darwinian evolution of vocal learning in other animals
suggests that the initial fixation of a key prerequisite to language into the
human genome may actually have required initially side-stepping not only ico-
nicity, but the urge to mean itself. If sign languages came later, they would not
have faced this constraint.1. Introduction
The origin of human language is intrinsically interesting to humans. This differ-
ence between humans and other sentient animals must have been obvious to
Palaeolithic humans; and the recent resurgence of interest in language origins
(e.g. [1–10]) has been little hindered by the paucity of hard evidence (a Pleisto-
cene video would be nice)—or sensible admonitions to attend to more tractable
problems. The following attempts to bring a fresh perspective by using an ana-
logy with the origin and evolution of cellular coding systems. In other places
[11–15], I have argued that DNA-and-protein-based life and language-based
human thought may have enough in common—as the only two naturally
occurring examples of a system using long code strings to construct thousands
of parallel self-assembling meaning strings—to make it fruitful to use one
system to make analogical predictions about the other. Two insights reached
in the course of developing that analogy are useful here: (i) the difference
between the origin and the evolution of a symbol-using system and
(ii) the critical role played at the origin of the system by intermediate strings
of ‘symbol-representation’ segments with properties partway between symbol
and meaning. This unconventional starting point leads us to a new physical
perspective on iconicity and arbitrariness.
Predictive analogy [16]—where a map of object properties and relations is
drawn between a source and a target field to make predictions about less well-
understood objects and relations in the target field—has served in the history of
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rails onwhich it often runswithin a field. For example, Darwin’s
Origin of Species is essentially a book-length analogy between
animal breeding (artificial selection) and a postulated analogue
of it in nature untouched by humans (natural selection).
Merely wandering off track, however, does not help unless sup-
port for a resulting new idea can be adduced from within the
target field. But analogical mapping can also provide insight
into the source domain. Much of the present issue concerns an
analogy between spoken language and signed language,
which are implemented with different sensory andmotor mod-
alities and differ in their detailed structure and brain
implementation. Our understanding of human language capa-
bilities has been deepened and generalized by using that
mapping in both directions. Certainly, the analogy with cellu-
lar-level coding systems spans a much greater distance then
that one. But that very distance from uniquely human abilities
promotes objectivity. Interestingly, the analogy between
human and cellular symbol use was used by the first molecular
biologists to reason about cells, not the otherwayaround [13,17].03032. Origin versus evolution
In discussions about how life came into existence, it is common
to distinguish the origin of life from the Darwinian evolution of
life [18]. The core of every living cell is a system for converting
genes into proteins—that is, DNA symbol sequences into
amino acid meaning chains that spontaneously fold into the
three-dimensional molecular machinery of the cell, which
includes enzymes, receptors, fantastical diffusion-driven mem-
brane rotors for generating ATP [19], force-producing strands
that use ATP and so on. Though this is confusingly called
‘protein translation’ for historical reasons (based on the orig-
inal molecular biologists’ casual and faulty analogy with
Morse code!), it is now understood by molecular biologists
as the process by which DNA symbol strings are turned into
phenotypic protein meanings.
The problem of the origin of such a system, however, is not
really an evolutionary problem in the usual Darwinian sense of
the word. If we shrink ourselves down to molecular size and
look at what cells do, it becomes clearer that cells somehow
invented a new kind of molecular-level intentionality—a way
to partly overcome the deterministic thermodynamic buffetings
to which all matter is subject. This does not imply that cells
create mysterious, irreducible holistic forces; in fact, we have a
deep mechanistic understanding of how they work. But it is
a natural way of characterizing what goes on in cells that
distinguishes it from the prebiotic chemical cycles in the
atmosphere, in volcanism, exposed mountain ridges and
sedimentation in rivers, shores, down to the ocean floor, all
of which involve an energy-dissipating, order-creating, but
non-biological kind of ‘evolution’.
The chemical soups out of which life arose were already
complex systems containing many different types of dynami-
cally stable units. For example, it is thought that among other
things, prebiotic soups contained isolated amino acids, the
eventual constituents of biotic protein chains. Cells, however,
invented a way to encode, use and reproduce information
about how to cause thousands of different chemical reactions
in this soup to happen. The tricky part is that the code strings,
as well as all of the interpreting apparatus for them, had to be
in the soup where everything was still subject to the soup’sdeterministic buffetings. At the outset, proto-information
must have been somehow partially hidden from the degrada-
tive attack of the soup. But once cells came online, they were
able to speed up many chemical reactions, prevent others,
invent new ones that never used to happen at all, and
above all, order, organize and compartmentalize the chemical
reactions. In short, code-using cells took over forceful control
of chemical phenomena in local regions of the otherwise still
prebiotic soup at the energetic expense of their surroundings.
But this ‘evolution’ from prebiotic to biotic systems was not
modern Darwinian evolution. Until most of the code-using
systemwas inplace,bonafideDarwinianevolutionas it isusually
defined—heritable variations in fitness [20]—was not possible.
Darwinian ‘heritable variations in fitness’ pre-supposes a geno-
type/phenotype distinction and full cellular intentionality—not
mere replication in a biochemist’s well-supplied reaction
chamber. The central problem of the origin of the coding
system in cellular life is to try to come up with pre-Darwinian
reasons for how such an intentional system might have arisen
out of prebiotic situations lacking intentionality.3. A second origin
In thinking about the origin of the higher-level symbol-using
system in human language and culture, the situation is quite
a bit more complex as human language was built upon a pre-
existing cellular genetic system that was already capable of
Darwinian evolution. Despite huge differences in scale, it is
a remarkable fact that the fundamental rate of meaning
assembly in these two very differently scaled systems
is almost the same—a handful of amino acids per second, a
handful of word meanings per second. Despite this simi-
larity, language-based cultural evolution is much faster
than biological evolution; lately, it has gotten so fast that bio-
logical evolution is effectively stationary by comparison
(there is precious little ‘nature untouched by humans’ left).
The faster speed of cultural, language-based evolution is lar-
gely attributable to the fact that cellular symbols strings
(DNA and RNA) are comprehended (turned into protein
meanings) but never produced from meanings; cells instead
have to wait a long time for favourable mutations to occur.
Human language, by contrast, is a more dynamic, free-for-
all, two-way system in which people willy-nilly inject
mental-reaction-controlling speech symbol streams into each
other’s brains [13]. The great difference in effective evolution-
ary velocity has made it difficult for transient language- and
culturally-transmitted memes to be fixed in the much more
slowly evolving genomes of long-lived humans. Despite
their great reach and elegant variation, humans are much
more genetically similar to each other than even small local
populations of most other animal species.
But there is one great point of interaction between the
DNA-based genetic system and the language-based human
cultural system—the genetic basis of the peculiar human abil-
ity to readily learn a language. It seems seductively natural to
try to come up with Darwinian evolutionary explanations for
why this might have occurred, in the spirit of evolutionary
psychology. By contrast, I think we may be able to make
more progress by considering the origin of language as essen-
tially a pre-evolutionary problem—that is, as the second
origin of a symbol-using, and evolution-supporting system,
one that partly relies on DNA-based symbols for its
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from biological evolution in its form and content.
In fact, human language might best be thought of as a
brain operating system that allowed us to partly overcome
the constraints on the Darwinian biological evolution of be-
haviour in much the same way that cells have partly
overcome the deterministic constraints on the ‘evolution’—
now in the physicist’s sense of ‘the evolution of a dynamical
system’—of prebiotic soups. From this analogical perspective,
the origin of language may have involved the reinvention of
the trick of hiding information ‘in plain view’ from the dissi-
pative attack of the ‘soup’. But this time, the ‘soup’ consisted
of Darwinian constraints on the evolution of animal behav-
iour. Instead of using Darwinian evolution to explain
language, our goal is to see how the origin of language
circumvented evolutionary psychology..B
369:201303034. The ‘semantic urge’
An assumption that lies behind many language origin scen-
arios is something that I have called the ‘semantic urge’.
This intuition grows out of the fact, just mentioned above,
that the human linguistic coding system was built on top of
a lower-level biological coding system that was already
capable of constructing sophisticated, non-linguistic cognitive
systems such as those in parrots, whales, dogs and primates.
The sustained goal-directedness of animals makes it very
hard to avoid the notion that human language must have
somehow grown out of an insistent craving of inarticulate
homininds to communicate complex meanings to each
other, perhaps initially by gesture, given that vocal motor
control of the kind possessed by the primates most closely
related to us probably was not up to the task.
This is at heart a Baldwinian picture, where behaviour
provides a selective context that drives standard Darwinian
evolution [21]. As noted above, there is little tendency to
fall back on intuitions like this in thinking about the origin
of cellular life because cellular life had no analogous pre-
existing, code-using system capable of goal-directed behav-
iour beneath it. For example, one influential picture about
the origin of life is that proto-symbol chains emerged first
without standing for anything and then only later were
taken over as a code for other meaning chains that could
fold up and control chemical reactions. There is no Baldwi-
nian semantic urge of prebiotic soups to control their
surroundings that drives the emergence of cellular proto-
symbol chains. The picture of proto-language that we arrive
at by taking this analogy seriously is somewhat peculiar;
but it fits much better with what we know about the evol-
ution of vocal behaviour in other animals (see also
[9,13,14,22,23]). Before doing that, let’s first review some of
the evidence for the origin of symbols and proto-symbols at
the cellular level.5. The ‘RNA world’ without a semantic urge
The original idea of an ‘RNA world’ [24] was independently
proposed by Woese [25], Crick [26] and Orgel [27] as a prede-
cessor of modern DNA/RNA/protein-based life. It gained
major support from the unexpected demonstration in the
early 1980s that RNA could act as a bona fide, enzyme-like
catalyst (an RNA segment in single-celled Tetrahymena wasdiscovered to fold up and catalyse RNA-splicing). The foun-
dational role of RNA is obvious from observing its current
position in cells (recent review: [28]).
Unlike other components of the cell, RNA can act either as
a one-dimensional symbol string (messenger RNA) or as a
three-dimensional self-folding controller of chemical reac-
tions (structural RNAs, based on the protein-like ability of
RNA to form precisely shaped surface cavities with high
specificity for particular substrates). This crucial Janus-like
ability is used sparingly; modern cells mostly employ pro-
teins, not RNAs, to control and catalyse the thousands of
chemical reactions they run. The instances where RNA is
used as a protein-like structure, however, stand at the very
centre of code-use in cells, including (i) RNA editing (in the
nucleolus, which generates ribosomes, and in the spliceo-
some, which edits messenger RNA), (ii) recognizing words
(codons) in code-like messenger RNA strings (by transfer
RNA) and, most importantly, (iii) using the sequence of
recognized words in messenger RNA code strings to assem-
ble individual amino acid meaning units into functional
protein chains (by ribosomal RNA).
The idea that the dual roles of RNA as code and catalyst
might have bootstrapped life gained support over the years
as additional catalytic RNAs were discovered, and especially
after large-scale structural RNAs (e.g. ribosomes) were finally
crystallized showing that it was the RNA itself, not the
associated proteins, that directly catalysed the attachment of
each coded-for amino acid ‘meaning unit’ onto the growing
protein chain [29–31].6. The origin of proto-information: before the
RNA world
Despite the intuitive plausibility of the ‘RNA world’, how-
ever, it has proved to difficult to find plausible prebiotic
synthesis pathways for nucleotides, the subunits of RNA
[32]. This stands in sharp contrast to the easy prebiotic avail-
ability of amino acids [33,34], the eventual molecular units of
meaning. Many origin-of-life researchers were led to search
for chain-like prebiotic precursors of RNA itself based on
more easily obtainable subunits than nucleotides [35]. A
key feature of this search—so obvious to those within the
field of prebiotic synthesis that it is rarely explicitly stated—
is to find reasons other than the ability to code for amino
acid meanings as to why a pre-RNA-like molecule might
have come into existence.
Once pre-RNA or RNA or existed, its dual role as a cata-
lyst (protein-like) and a code-chain (DNA-like) could then be
discovered, leading to something like an RNAworld [36–38],
and then finally to modern DNA/RNA/protein life, where
code-only DNA and meaning-only proteins occupy opposite
ends of the spectrum from symbol to meaning.7. Problems with the semantic urge in the
prelinguistic world
In turning back to language, many language origins scenarios
start with a repertoire of already meaningful vocalizations
like those used by many different animal species [39] and
then attempt to come up with a reason—typically, the seman-
tic urge—for why they might have multiplied [40,41]. Several
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with this standard scenario. Animal calls—such as the well-
studied set of vervet monkey alarm calls [44], but also calls
in many other animal species—are laden with emotional
meaning. The usual explanation for this is that alarm calls
often are emitted in life and death situations, which generates
strong selection pressure to maintain call reliability; this
reliability has been ensured across many diverse species by
tightly neurally tying calls to the emotional state of both
the sender and the receiver. This tight linkage, however, pre-
sents a problem for the scenario of calls as a starting point for
proto-language; the number of different emotional states is
rather small, and emotional states do not follow each other
in a quick, regular succession like words must do (see
below, on the need for speed).
The origin of language required the development of a
large inventory of sound combinations in order to code for
thousands of meanings that are made more specific by assem-
bling them into strings at the rapid rate of several words per
second. Individual word meanings—especially for high-
frequency polysemous words central to every language,
such as ‘over’, ‘put‘, ‘give’, ‘line’, ‘big’ or ‘hand’—are freed
from emotion when compared to animal calls. Certainly,
some single words such as epithets can be intrinsically emot-
ive, but these are in a small minority. Perhaps, the difficulty
of imagining a path from a handful of emotive calls to the
5000-word core of mostly emotionally neutral words in
human language stems from the fact that the two are phylo-
genetically unrelated. The analogy with the RNA world and
the pre-RNA world suggests that perhaps we should instead
try to find a way by which a large pool of pre-RNA-like pre-
words might have been generated—units that are like words
in many sensory and motor respects, but that do not yet stand
for anything.
In the cellular situation, the bonds between any pair
of RNA nucleotides in a chain are approximately equally
stable. In Sereno [13], I called this arbitrariness2 (to distin-
guish it from classical pairwise symbol–object Saussurean
arbitrariness1). Arbitrariness2 can be thought of as a trick to
prevent the prebiotic soup from recognizing and thus selec-
tively destroying the incipient information ‘hiding’ there in
the form of different sequences. For pre-language, we may
have needed a similar trick to prevent individual units or
small groups of them in incipient speech symbol chains from
(initially) being recognized as meaningful. Iconicity—but also
any accidental arbitrary1 (Saussurean) attachment of the
vocal pre-symbol groups to emotional meaning—may have
actually been a Darwinian evolutionary impediment to the
development of a large enough catalogue of vocal
pre-symbol segments. As in the molecular case, proto-
information at the linguistic level may initially have been
hidden from the ‘soup’ of animal behaviour ‘in plain sight’
to allow it to accrete, and to avoid having it attacked and
destroyed by having it elicit particular behaviours in other ani-
mals, which would then drag everything back into the
simplified sound features and semantics, and automatic
emotional binding of isolated alarm calls and affiliative calls.8. Information versus proto-information
In Shannon–Weaver information theory, the more random
and unpredictable a signal on a channel is (by analogy withchemical entropy), the more information it can potentially
convey [45]. An image with large patches of white and black
transmitted pixel by pixel is a very non-random signal. If
this image is first compressed—e.g. by sending the number
of white or black pixels in an all-white or all-black run
rather than each pixel separately—the signal would be shor-
tened while containing the same amount of information, but
it would also begin to look more like unpredictable random
noise. Information theory assumes that the channel—but also
the machinery at either end that can send and understand
the message—are both already there.
In thinking about origins, we have instead to think about
how the channel, interpreters and most importantly the one-
dimensional strings themselves came into being in the first
place. There is an endless supply of ‘uselessly random’
things in the world that are not information or even proto-
information because there is no way to access the strings in
them, or because they do not even form one-dimensional
strings at all (like disconnected gas molecules). In contrast
to usual language origin scenarios that start with single
meaningful Saussurean sign–object pairs, the perspective
here is to look instead for plausible sources of proto-infor-
mation strings—currently unused, meaning nothing, but
potentially usable. Good quality proto-information should be
random-appearing, like efficient Shannon information,
which requires the ability to attach symbol segments into
one-dimensional strings in roughly random orders. But just
as critically, there needs to be a pre-existing productive mech-
anism for generating and processing these one-dimensional
strings in plain view, so they could eventually be integrated
into a meaning delivery system, but with their content
initially hidden because of their apparent randomness.
Strong one-dimensional chains (of nucleotides, amino acids
and saccharides) are what principally physically distinguish
the current biotic molecular world from the prebiotic world
of rocks and minerals. These chains are held together by
strong covalent bonds in aqueous solution. Rocks and minerals
are certainly stronger than biomolecules when dry; but once
dissolved in water (where all the action is), the chains and lat-
tices in rocks and minerals all break down into small pieces.
Human language is distinguished from animal communication
in an analogous way—the towering sequence complexity of the
long one-dimensional chains in human language set it far apart
from meaning-carrying signal systems in every other animal.
The analogy with the RNA world suggests that we look for
sources of meaningless proto-information chains rather than
the more traditional and intuitive approach of trying to find
ways of making sentence-like chains out of already bound
together but isolated symbol-referent pairs. Evidence from
the evolution of animal vocal behaviour provides intriguing
sources for such meaningless chains.9. The example of birdsong
The possible relation between birdsong and speech was noted
early on. Darwin—who in Origin of Species [46] often discussed
the relation between biological and linguistic evolution
(interestingly, to argue that biological evolution might be like
language evolution, not vice versa!)—turned briefly, in the
Descent of Man [47], to language origins. Darwin was especially
fond of scenarios in which a structure had initially evolved for
one purpose only to become a ‘preadaptation’ for another.
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a gestural substrate, he suggested that language developed out
of a form of ‘rudimentary song’, a kind of purely prosodic pre-
language that conveyed emotions and other broad, unitary
meanings in much the same way that pitch modulation and
emphasis are used in modern speech. Darwin mentions the
flashy hooting vocalizations of gibbons, which are generated
during territorial and courtship displays, as something like
what he had in mind, but pointed out that birdsong provided
‘in several respects the nearest analogy to language’ ([47],
p. 55), citing the work of Daines Barrington a century before
[48] on the extended learning period for birdsong, the initial
‘babbling’ stage and the development of birdsong dialects.
Modern research on birdsong has provided a neurobiologi-
cal foundation for these earlier hunches, but has also revealed
a system that looks a good deal more like human-style, ‘left-
hemisphere’ speech than like the call systems of other animals
(including gibbons) [10,49–51], but also the call systems of
songbirds themselves, who have retained their limited set of
emotional calls alongside song. There is a powerful perennial
tendency outside fields explicitly focused on evolutionary pro-
cesses to think of evolution in terms of a ‘Great Chain of Being’
and to ignore the mosaic nature of evolution. Thus, birdsong
has often been dismissed as a model of human language for
the reason that monkeys seem much smarter than some
birds, or that monkey calls seem to have more semantic con-
tent than birdsong. In fact, the importance of birdsong in the
present context (only dimly glimpsed by Darwin) is exactly
the fact that a set of language-like features have evolved
in the absence of a semantic function.
Birdsong requires a significant learning period, during the
early parts of which the young bird is silent. If a bird is not
exposed to a tutor song within a certain early critical period,
it will produce only a crude version of its species’ song. Nor-
mally exposed young birds initially produce sounds called
subsong that resemble the progression of types of babbling
in baby humans—initially a broad range of sounds are pro-
duced, followed by an unorganized recombination of
species-specific song fragments, and then finally, adult song.
Within a species, there are regional dialects that are learned
from a bird’s regional peers; artificial rearing experiments
show that birds learn the dialect of their tutors, regardless of
their genetic background. Adult song repertoires can be con-
siderable; some wrens produce hundreds of distinct songs,
each containing 5–20 ‘syllables’, while mockingbirds produce
virtually endless sequences of different syllables in variable
orders. Good singers may have a thousand or more distinct
‘syllables’ (a ‘syllable’ consists of a particular figure sometimes
repeated once or twice; in this respect, it is unlike a phonetic
syllable, which consists of one or more consonants and a
vowel). If a songbird is deafened before learning to sing, it
will fail to produce song-like sounds as an adult. By contrast,
non-song birds and many other animals including non-human
primates (e.g. gibbons) that do not learn complex serial vocal
patterns from their peers, still come to produce their species-
specific sound repertoire when deafened at birth [52]. In
many respects, it might be more accurate to call it ‘birdspeech’,
because birdsong differs from human singing and musical per-
formance in many ways; for example, birdsong lacks a regular
metre, musical tonality and harmony (though see European
starlings on ‘harmony’ in §13).
The parallel evolution of fine-grained vocal control in singing
birds affords a crucial comparative perspective on the anatomicalandneural constraints onauditory–motor learning andperform-
ance. Birdsong is initiated in a structure called the syrinx,which is
evolutionarily related to (and controlled by the same nerve as)
the tongue. It is generated primarily by directly controlling the
fundamental frequency produced by the syrinx. Human
speech sounds, by contrast, are generated by filtering and mod-
ulating thehigher harmonics of the fundamental frequencyof the
vocal cords in the larynx (by controlling the position of the
tongue in the pharyngeal and oral cavities), making the higher
frequency parts of speech sounds independent of fundamental
frequency (voice pitch). Nonetheless, in many respects, birdsong
is much more like human speech than are the vocalizations of
other animals, some of which can even modulate laryngeal har-
monics (for example,monkeys [53],male deer [54] and seals [55])
in a human speech-like fashion.
There are intriguing clues about the evolution of fine vocal
control from neuroanatomy of the avian song system. For
example, motor output neurons in the forebrain (in the
robust nucleus of the arcopallium, RA) of songbirds have
gained direct access to motoneurons controlling the syrinx
vocalization musculature. Projections from RA bypass the
brainstem pattern generator circuitry for calls through which
all forebrain outputs must pass in non-song birds like ducks
[56,57] but also in squirrel monkeys [58,59] and macaque mon-
keys [60]. There is a striking parallel here to the evolution of
fine finger control in primates (but also finger control in rac-
coons, as a yet another reminder that evolution is a bush,
not a linear Great Chain of Being), where motor cortex neurons
have also come to contact finger motoneurons directly, bypass-
ing pattern generators for coordinated limb movement
situated in the spinal cord; hand motor cortex in cats, by con-
trast, contacts primarily the spinal pattern generators, which
then have the only private access to motoneurons. The more
direct access afforded to the forebrain in the case of the song-
bird syrinx and the primate and raccoon hand presumably
underlies more complex, differentiated, learned control of
these effectors. Note that this means that the relevant forebrain
motor output areas have essentially come to assume a lower
level in the motor control hierarchy, allowing the development
of other forebrain pattern-generating centres that can operate
in parallel with and independent of the brainstem and spinal
pattern-generating circuitry that is still needed for locomotion
in the case of the hand, and non-song vocalization in the case
of the syrinx.10. Speech-like birdsong carries less meaning
than vocal call systems do
The most striking characteristic of birdsong, however, in
light of its prodigious complexity, is its essential lack of
semantic content. Individual syllables or song fragments do
not seem to have any specific meaning outside of being
part of a particular song; and particular songs do not seem
to convey specific content. Nor do birds appear to produce
anything like ‘words’ by recombining their ‘syllables’ in
order to signify concepts. Despite having motor, vocaliza-
tion and auditory equipment ideally suited to support the
re-combinable speech-symbol half of a language-like
meaning-conveying system, birdsong seems to communicate
only very general meanings. Songs serve to mark territories,
identify the singer’s species, attract mates and cause ovula-
tion, often all at once. The messages communicated by
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municated by, for example, vervet monkey calls—which have
been shown to signify rather elaborate distinctions among
predators and conspecifics [44], despite the fact that these
unlearned, unitary calls are drastically simpler than birdsong.
This difference in referential content is particularly obvious
when we consider the ‘meaning’ of a handful of syllables of a
songbird’s song; though emotion is keenly involved inmotivat-
ing the bird to begin singing, the identity and order of syllables
carry no additional specific emotional baggage.
Attempts to find particular ordering patterns in bird song
are a topic of hot debate, particularly with respect to what
level of complexity of song grammars birds are able to recog-
nize after training [61]. Without visiting that particular
debate, in the case of natural song sequences, researchers
have shown that song order is not random, but can be mod-
elled with hidden Markov models [62]. However, in support
of the present line of argument on the meaninglessness of
sequences in birdsong, there is little evidence that the differ-
ent naturally occurring syllable and song orders themselves
signify different things, at least from observational studies
of the behaviours of singer or listener birds.11. Sexual selection and birdsong
One plausible theory about birdsong is that it was a product of
runaway sexual selection—like the male peacock tail or outsize
antlers in male deer, or huge inconvenient-looking sexual
swellings in female baboons and female chimpanzees. Elabor-
ate singing abilities seem to have been preferred by mates,
despite making little direct contribution to fitness beyond the
fact that they were preferred. Sexual selection stands in con-
trast to natural selection, which rewards improved function
like a stronger beak or more efficient wings. Certainly, a com-
plex song can serve as a sign of a mate fitter in other non-song
respects. It is a little more difficult to explain the maintenance
of extreme examples this way, especially when sexually
selected features run the risk of impeding other functions
(huge antlers) or attracting predators (elaborate vocal dis-
plays). Zahavi [63] has suggested that these handicaps have
evolved to serve as an honest signal; the feature advertises
that the animal was fit enough to overcome the handicap.
Though empirical support for the handicap model from
animal studies has been mixed, there is little doubt that
sexual selection in general can drive evolution in a different
direction from natural (functional) selection.
Sexual selection is not confined to female choice affecting
male characters (see primate sexual swellings above). And
both the male and female sing in some songbird species.
Bay wren male–female monogamous pairs, for example, exe-
cute precisely coordinated ‘duets’ where the pair trade
singing back and forth several times a second, creating
what sounds to an untrained ear like the song of a single
bird (see example in [23]). In these birds, the song control
nuclei are large and hormone-sensitive in females as well as
males [64]. The generally accepted explanation for this behav-
iour is that the attractiveness of the male’s song to listening
females is reduced when a duetting female is heard
intimately trading back and forth with that male.
Several whale species have independently evolved a vocal
learning system that resembles birdsong in a large number of
respects and provides a key additional example of how aspeech-like vocal learning system can evolve without a
‘semantic urge’ [65]. Humpback whales learn to precisely
reproduce long sequences of sounds and culturally transmit
them to animals that are genetically unrelated. The main
difference is that whale songs are lower in pitch, and individ-
ual songs unfold over a minute instead of several seconds.
The underwater acoustic environment of the ocean is quite
reverberant, due to the faster and more efficient propagation
of sound in water and as a result of reflections from the
air–water boundary. This may be one reason for whales’
more leisurely tempi. As with birdsong, whale song has
social and sexual functions, and precise, lengthy sequence
perception and generation.12. The need for speed
One idea implicitly introduced above was the notion that
meaning assembly in language might demand a certain mini-
mum speed, like flying. At first, it might seem that there is no
‘minimum speed’ for language as strongly motivated humans
(e.g. Stephen Hawking) are capable of comprehending and
producing language at very slow rates (e.g. one word per
minute). However, in the context of the origin of language,
for a proto-meaning-assembly process to be useful in a social
context among proto-linguistic animals, it is less clear that
such extremely leisurely rates would be practical; the chance
of non-linguistic interactions and events disturbing the mean-
ing assembly process increases as the interword time goes up.
A second motivation for speed is that if language meaning
assembly piggy-backed on non-linguistic visual scene assem-
bly (see below), the word-meanings-per-second rate might
initially have had to more closely match the typical rate of
uptake of sequential glances used by the visual system (several
new fixations per second).
These two considerations may provide additional
independent motivations for why elaborate, rapid, but non-
meaningful perceptual and motor string sequencing might have
had to evolve first in order to boot language. These arguments
are relevant not only for vocal signalling but also for visuoman-
ual signalling. It is important not to forget that a small set of
meaningful alarm calls and meaningful gestures have indepen-
dently evolved in a very large number of different animal
species for a half a billion years. The evolutionary advantage
to a species of being able to communicate more complex mean-
ings would have been (and remains) great; that is, there must
have been countless opportunities to extendunitary pre-existing
meaningful calls or gestures, but none were able to be taken.13. A birdsong-like ‘RNA world’ for pre-language
With the context provided above, we can see our way to a
surprising extension of Darwin’s language-origins theory.
On the evidence of the avian case, it seems possible that
early hominids might have initially evolved an elaborate
system of essentially phonetic vocalizations—a kind
of ‘song talk’ with no attached semantics—as a result of
sexual selection. In this view, a number of the specializations
for speech-related auditory–vocal control evolved for entirely
non-semantic reasons. Perhaps early hominid pairs ‘duetted’
like bay wrens for several million years before reference was
invented. At first, it might seem unreasonable to imagine
almost fully developed human speech without meaning;
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whale example—suggest that the evolution of the ability to
generate elaborate but meaningless vocal sequences is a
reasonably common, evolutionarily stable strategy. Turning
standard Baldwinian language origins scenarios on their
heads, the pre-adapted ‘symbols’-without-meaning system
might have only been taken over for use as a semantic vehicle
at the very last moment. The scenario of talking before refer-
ential speech is odd, but no odder than birdsong and whale
song themselves.
This scenario contrasts with Fitch’s idea that laryngeal
descent in hominids (which occurs early in postnatal devel-
opment) might have been used as a strategy to indicate
large size in males, by analogy with the realtime laryngeal
descent that occurs during calls made by rutting male deer
[54]. A functionally similar kind of call, though using res-
onant air sacs instead of laryngeal descent, is well known in
gibbons and orangutans, and it closely resembles emotional-
meaning-laden signals in standard animal call systems.
Unlike birdsong, these primate calls develop even in
deafened animals, indicating that learning is not required.
The birdsong model suggests instead that there was
runaway selection for complex sequences of essentially mean-
ingless segments—each individually untied from particular
emotions—as opposed to selection for a large-sounding roar
or a deep voice. This is not to detract from throaty roars,
which are a common theme in male animal vocalizations; but
elaborate sequences can be just as attractive as deep throatiness.
Different bird lineages have explored many intriguing ways of
attractively increasing song complexity. The superb lyrebird
(‘superb’ is part of the common name) accurately imitates
sounds in its forest environment, including the sounds of
other birds and other animals, and poignantly, the sound of
chain saws, attracting mates by means of a large and impress-
ively detailed repertoire [66]. European starling males can
independently manipulate the two halves of their syrinx
during singing to create a ‘one man band’ effect with a lower
frequency ‘bass line’ overlaid by asynchronous higher pitched
notes. Experiments with playback show that the more complex
songs sung by older, more experienced starling males are more
effective at inducing ovulation [67]. Finally, although male plus
female singing like the wren example discussed above is less
common than male-only singing, it has nevertheless evolved
in more than one lineage (e.g. female superb lyrebirds are
quite competent imitators), overcoming objections (e.g. [68],
p. 96) that sexual selection cannot explain female speech.14. Analogues of structural and catalytic RNA in
the auditory system
As mentioned above, RNA molecules serve both as a code
(messenger RNA), but also critically as non-code-like, self-
folding word-recognition devices (transfer RNA) and cataly-
tic meaning chain-assembly devices (ribosomal RNA). By
analogy, the internal representations of speech sound
sequences that a primate neurobiologist would expect to
find in the human superior lateral temporal cortex may
have acquired other functions besides merely serving as
internal copies of the speech stream. Perhaps there was a lei-
surely ‘RNAworld’-like stage as sexual selection was shaping
vocal learning, where RNA-like speech sound representations
in the auditory temporal lobe interacted with each other andgradually increased in complexity without being attached to
meanings (e.g. visual meanings).
Then at a later point, the ‘catalytic’ abilities of uninter-
preted speech streams were suddenly exposed in the
service of attaching visual meaning representations into
chains in a manner similar to the ribosomal catalysis of
amino acid chains. Non-symbolic functions for internal rep-
resentations of uninterpreted speech streams is a strange
idea that would require more evidence than we currently
have for it to be taken seriously; however, the central role
of structural/catalytic RNA in protein synthesis (as opposed
to being a mere code-like messenger) is arguably just as
strange—and it took many years before that idea was finally
fully accepted.
Nothing has been said (1) about how the internal represen-
tations of speech sounds got connected to visual meanings, or
(2) about the dynamics of how concatenated visual meaning
patterns interact in the complex ‘mental metabolism’ that
must be present in linguistically competent human brains.
But perhaps that second bit did not have to be invented out
of whole cloth. Instead, it could have piggy-backed on an
already existing system for assembling visual inputs arriving
from early visual areas during the process of visual scene com-
prehension; the higher-level visual system was already an
expert in the rapid serial assembly of successive glances. The
implication is that the trick of language was not to have
invented the basic meaningful units—nor even the rules for
how concatenated chains of visual units self-assemble—but
merely to have found a symbol-string-directed way of
making standardized connections between them [3,11–13,15].15. Language as code-directed scene
comprehension
Vision is very important to primates; in fact, almost half of the
cortex in primates consists of areas that are specialized for
visual processing. Primate auditory and somatosensory areas
each cover about one-quarter as much cortical surface area
as visual areas do [69,70]. Together with the fact that virtually
all anthropoid primates (monkeys, apes and humans) are diur-
nal, it makes sense for a substantial core of concrete word
meanings concerning objects, properties, actions, manners
and paths to be represented in the visual system. The idea
that visual representations may be important in the semantics
of natural language [3] has been around for a long time (in lin-
guistics; see [71–74]). Common to those approaches is the
notion that concrete visual meanings have been extended via
analogical processes to deal with more abstract objects and
relations. An unremarkable sentence like ‘I think I got my
idea across to him’ uses unmarked ‘get’, ‘across’ and ‘him’
as if the abstract concept ‘idea’ were a physical object being
transported across a physical bridge from me to him. The pre-
sent proposal goes further in suggesting a particularly direct
moment-to-moment relationship between the mechanisms of
scene and discourse comprehension.
Language—especially when transcribed to text—quite
obviously has a fundamentally serial nature. At first, vision
might seem to be less serial. This is in large part because we
cannot as easily and compactly ‘write’ vision aswe can language.
But from the point of view of primary visual cortex (or the view
of a filmmaker), the integration of successive glances in the com-
prehension of a visual scene requires a kind of serial assembly
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of word meanings in discourse comprehension. Primates make
long series of fixations at the rate of several new views per
second during scene comprehension. Each fixation brings the
high-receptor-density fovea of the retina to a new part of the
visual scene and generates new activity in V1 dominated by
objects at fixation, which largely displaces the activity there
caused by the previous fixation. Higher visual areas with less
precise retinotopy somehow integrate information from these
disconnected anddistorted (centre-magnified) activity sequences
across time (e.g. [75]) to generate an internal representation of the
location, identity and relations of the relevant objects in the cur-
rent scene that serves as a basis for moment-to-moment action.
There are a number of aspects of this initially strictly serial pro-
cess that are strongly reminiscent of serial meaning integration
in language comprehension.
For example, isolated glances taken out of context are as
underspecified and polysemous as a single word taken out of
discourse context. The context-free information available from
an isolated 250 ms glance at a common object—e.g. a leaf on
a nearby branch—could mean a lot of different things in the
context of preceding and following glances—e.g. something to
walk on (the branch), something to eat, something to duck
under, something to grab onto to correct balance, something
to brush aside, something to shake or something completely
irrelevant. The specific visual meaning in a single glance is
only sharpened and fully developed after considering the con-
text of the full train of glances (and motor state) that came
before and after it. This is similar to the integration of linguistic
meaning from word strings. An isolated 250 ms experience of a
high-frequency word like ‘line’ taken out of context is as poly-
semous as the glance at a leaf on a branch; it could be about
‘line up those objects’, or ‘line up a supplier’, or a ‘line of
kings’ or a ‘line of thought’, ‘in line with what I’m thinking’,
or ‘don’t cross that line’, or prosaically, ‘a clothes line’.
Though the meanings conjured up here are often listed in a dic-
tionary under ‘line’, most of the work may instead get done by
interaction with context, as in the case of the leafy branch; a
truly isolated experience of the unique semantic content of
‘line’ (with anaesthesia before and after) is probably much
more minimal than what is found in the dictionary. The
impetus for thinking this way came from considering the
truly unremarkable chemical properties of isolated amino
acids—the word meanings at the molecular level—compared
to their incredible, multifarious catalytic specificity upon
their mere concatenation into self-folding amino acid chains.
Second, there is a physical divide in the visual system
between motion processing—in the middle temporal area
(MT), the medial superior temporal area dorsal division
(MSTd), the lateral intraparietal area (LIP), the ventral intra-
parietal area (VIP)—and object property processing—shape,
colour and object identity in the fourth visual area (V4) and
inferotemporal areas. Though the properties of neurons in the
two pathways are somewhat less distinct than once thought
(e.g. [76]), and recent comprehensive analysis of connections
has turned up a large number of additional (though numeri-
cally sparse) connections [70], this basic division remains the
first principal component of organization in the visual system.
In language, there is a similar primary divide between noun/
adjective and verb/manner/path in phrasal syntax.
Third, information from temporally distant glances fixating
roughly the same thing must be tied together, as with linguis-
tic anaphora. For example, an initial glance at a particularmonkey’s face might be followed by glances at a branch, the
ground, a different monkey, a cloud (looking for an eagle) or
a flower, before the same monkey is finally re-fixated. At
that moment, the particular monkey must be re-identified
(e.g. the fixation might have fallen on the target monkey’s
shoulder rather than the face, or mostly in the opposite hemi-
field) and then information from the previous fixation must be
integrated with information from the current fixation; for
example, that particular monkey could be looking more
aggressive than he was at last glance, or now he has turned
away, or now he is eating a small plant root, or now he is in
the same position and mood as he was in the previous glance.
In both signed and spoken language, there are a variety of
long distance anaphoric dependencies and interactions estab-
lished as a serial discourse is played out. These range from
pronouns ‘I told John about the job; he agreed to do it’, to pro-
nominals, to more complex pointers in realistic multisentence
discourses. For example, I could metonymically refer to the con-
tent of the entire previous paragraph with ‘that crazy “visual
anaphora” idea’.
None of this implies that scene representations (or their
presumed linguistic fellows) need look anything like pictures;
the patterns in question are very likely distributed across
many areas, a number of which show little retinotopy.
One main difference between scene and discourse com-
prehension is, of course, that scene comprehension is tied
closely to the current scene. Discourse comprehension could
be thought of as a kind of fictive visual scene comprehension
directed, in the case of spoken language comprehension, by
sequences of phoneme representations in secondary auditory
cortex. The obvious advantage of linguistic discourse
comprehension is that we are no longer tied to the current
scene. However, once the appropriate visual word meaning
patterns have been called up and bound together, the
nature and interactions of the composite pattern might be
conditioned mainly by the prelinguistic rules of interaction
of scene representations in primate visual areas networks.
In this sense, a part of what has been called linguistic
syntax and semantics might not be modular with respect to
the neuroscience of vision.
There is in fact substantial evidence that visual areas in
humans are involved in specifically linguistic functions. There
is a kind of aphasia that is self-contradictorily called ‘transcorti-
cal sensory’ aphasia (i.e. ‘across-from-the-language-cortex’
aphasia!) that is generated by a lesion in left human inferotem-
poral cortex [77]. Many of these lesions are so posterior and
ventral that they are associated with overt visual field defects.
Transcortical sensory aphasics have poor, Wernicke’s-like com-
prehension, yet paradoxically (at least in the context of
traditional models of language comprehension) can repeat
words effortlessly. Far from being ‘across from the language
cortex’, the visual areas in inferotemporal cortex damaged in
these patients may be one primary site of semantic processing
in sighted humans. More recent cortical stimulation studies in
intact (but epileptic) brains have demonstrated language arrest
from inferotemporal cortex stimulation ([78]; see also [79]) and
have also shown that middle temporal gyrus stimulation
(between auditory superior temporal cortex and visual inferior
temporal cortex) can create transcortical sensory aphasia-like be-
haviour (preserved repetition with poor comprehension) but
without impaired naming, pointing to the middle temporal
gyrus region as a key bridge point between input phonology
and more inferiorly located visual semantics [80].
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patientswithmore superior lesions, but thismayonly be an indi-
cation that the functions performed by visual cortex in language
comprehension are less lateralized than those performed by
auditory cortex and face motor cortex. This is consistent with
what we know about primate temporal visual areas; it has
long been known that permanent deficits in visual pattern recog-
nition in monkeys require bilateral inferotemporal cortex lesions
[81]. There is no need to assume that all the cortical areas
involved in language comprehension are equally lateralized.
Psycholinguistic experiments using pictures inserted into
sentences and priming between words and pictures [82,83]
suggest that it is surprisingly easy for visually represented con-
cepts to be integrated into ongoing linguistic discourse
comprehension or forwords to directlyactivate visual perceptual
representations. Thismay be another indicator of the closeness of
visual category representations to linguistic meanings. Certainly,
it is easier to make little pictures or movies to represent a large
range of word meanings than it is to make non-linguistic
sounds (how to purely auditorily represent ‘over’ or ‘give’?).
It is certainly not necessary to site all meaning in the
visual system. There is a rich world of non-symbolic auditory
and somatosensory experience. And a similar serial scene
assembly process to that described above for vision, but for
sequences of sounds or touches, must be done in those mod-
alities, too. And there are many other animals for whom
vision is not the primary distal sense, such as echolocating
bats or electric fish (many of which are nearly blind); bats
and electric fish must rely primarily on serial assembly of
auditory and electrosensory ‘glances’; for a bat, it would
probably be easier to comprehend an auditory ‘picture’ of
‘over’—a small object moving over a larger one—than it
would be for it to comprehend a visual one.16. Iconicity in sign and speech
At long last, we are positioned to consider iconicity and the
semantic urge in sign language.1 Individual signs often con-
tain handshapes, places of articulation or movements that
relatively straightforwardly refer to one or more parts of an
object, action, property or manner. Iconicity continues to
affect online lexical processing of signs in adults [84,85].
And iconicity in sign language extends into sign language
syntax, in the form of spatial pronominal and deictic refer-
ence, and as classifiers that modify subjects and verbs.
Iconic signs can vary across languages (e.g. ‘tree’ outlined
with two fingers versus represented as a trunk and branches
with a raised forearm). The referent may be difficult for a sign
language-naive hearing observer to guess; Klima & Bellugi
[86] classified the iconicity of signs on a scale ranging from
transparent to obscure, based on how evident the mappings
were to naive observers. But there is little doubt that iconicity
is more prevalent in signed languages than it is in spoken
languages. By Klima and Bellugi’s measure of transparency,
the most strongly iconic speech examples (outside of a
class of onamatopoetic speech sounds and ideophones)
would probably rate as ‘obscure’—for example, the high
vowel for ‘me’ or ‘here’ may both indicate closeness to the
speaker, while a lower vowel for ‘you’ or ‘there’ may indicate
greater distance.
The primary reason for this visual/auditory difference in
the prevalence of iconicity in sound and sign is simply thatthe visual system dominates the primate neocortex, making
vision the modality with the greatest iconic potential; it has
the most diverse set of representational machinery for charac-
terizing objects and features, and actions, paths and manners.
But vision did not always win. We have already mentioned
bats and electric fish. But consider catfish, which remarkably
use taste as a distal sense; the catfish brain has detailed and
repeated maps of taste buds [87], which are distributed
across not only its barbels and face, but cover its body all
the way down to the tail, and higher-level areas in the catfish
brain must do serial assembly of gustatory glances.
Another reason that visual iconicity is easier than auditory
iconicity is the intrinsic dimensionality of the respective recep-
tor surfaces and cortical maps. The visual receptor surface is
two-dimensional (eccentricity and polar angle) while the audi-
tory receptor surface is one-dimensional (frequency). Spatial
coordinates and relations among actors and objects in scenes
take a lot more work to construct using activity spread
across auditory bandpass filters than they do from the more
camera-like retinal movies relayed to V1.
From the view of this paper, a reason why language prob-
ably had a vocal origin is precisely that the more natural
visual iconicity of gestures might have been an impediment
to building up a large enough catalogue of meaningless
pre-symbolic gesture strings in evolutionary time.
But once the neural structures responsible for the control of
hierarchically structured vocalmotor patternswere fixed in the
human brain by Darwinian evolution, iconicity would no
longer serve an impediment and could instead turn into a con-
venient aid to sign language learning [88]. That it is not as
readily accessible in the auditory modality is auditory’s loss.
Finally, the idea of language in sighted humans as pri-
marily code-directed visual scene comprehension introduced
above provides a rationale for why auditory symbols might
initially have been preferred as opposed to visuomanual sym-
bols; given a vision-dominant diurnal animal, there would be
more overlap and potential interference between symbol
strings and meaning strings in the second case.17. Conclusion
Human auditory–vocal language was unlikely to have arisen
by the multiplication and concatenation of the small set of
hard-wired, meaningful, vocal alarm calls that have evolved
in a large number of different animal species. Evolutionary
constraints keep calls tightly bound to a small number of
emotional states as honest life-and-death signals, which pre-
vents them from being been converted into the low-cost
strings of thousands of phonemes used to communicate
linguistic semantics.
Rather, we turned to plausible Darwinian mechanisms—in
particular, sexual selection—to explain the evolution of the
neural control of complex learned vocalization attractive to
mates for its complexity and variation, but signifying nothing
specific. Birdsong and whale song are two parallel examples of
how complex neural machinery for auditory–vocal sequence
learning evolved by sexual selection without a semantic func-
tion. Attaching meaning to pre-symbols before they were
numerous enough, or before they were capable of being put
together fluently into long enough chains, risks a collapse
back to a set of isolated meaningful calls. Instead, a large
inventory of pre-symbols needed to be initially hidden from
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easier to hide proto-information in auditory–vocal sequences
than in visual-manual gesture sequences because of greater
natural iconicity associated with visual–manual gestures.
This was the first pre-adaptation for language and may have
taken several million years to fully develop.
The second pre-adaptation for language was a system for
assembling visual scene representations from long chains of
successive glances for the purpose of directing ongoing situ-
ated behaviour. This function was initially strongly tied to
content of the current scene, specifically a visual scene,
because vision is the primary distal sense in primates.
The origin of language may have been the result of
the fortuitous coming together of these two initially indepen-
dent Darwinian pre-adaptations. The result was the
formation of a second, higher-level symbol-using system
that has essentially detached itself from the constraints on
the evolutionary psychology of vocal control that are built
into the underlying Darwinian DNA-and-protein symbol-
using system. The new system was also super-charged
relative to the cellular-level symbol system because of the
added facility for symbol-string production that is not
found in the comprehension-only cellular system.
There remains the question of what might have accounted
for the coming together of these two systems. After a long
paper spent criticizing the idea of the semantic urge, perhaps
the semantic urge is just what was needed here! The main
argument above was not that the urge to mean did not exist,
or was irrelevant, but rather that its typical stable evolutionary
end state, discovered by countless lineages of animal species,
was a system of isolated meaningful alarm and affiliative
calls. Perhaps, the same urge to mean—when faced with the
unique context of (i) an elaborate primate visual system and
(ii) sexually selected receptive and productive facilities for
vocal learning of long random-appearing strings—resulted in
a new and revolutionary outcome of human language. This
explanation is certainly too simple-minded; but perhaps it
gives us a fresh jumping-off point.Looking at language today, we see a multi-modal, multi-
channel phenomenon that allows humans to control each
other’s minds in a much more specific and invasive way
than any other animal can, by injecting potent linguistic
symbol strings into each other’s brains. Modern language
has lost its fear of iconicity, both in development and adult-
hood. But maybe none of those features was there until
the very end. A long-standing problem in the origin of
human language is its sudden appearance. Modern-
appearing cultural artefacts only appear on the scene in the
Late Pleistocene; yet it must have taken a much longer time
for the anatomical and neural structures that control human
vocal language production to have evolved from their primi-
tive basal mammalian condition seen in all other anthropoid
primates. The birdsong/‘RNA-world’ picture described
above provides one way out of this problem. Perhaps non-
semantic, birdsong-like human speech was around for a
very long time, perhaps even dating back to early Homo
species. This could have set the stage for the emergence of
a linguistic ‘RNA-world’, where the word recognition and
chain assembly properties of still-meaningless speech–
sound representations could be leisurely discovered, and
then only grafted onto a pre-existing productive visual mean-
ing construction system at the very end. Kendon [68] recently
commented that language is ‘a poly-modalic activity today,
[and] so it must have been in its beginnings’. I would
agree—if ‘beginnings’ is taken to mean ‘the very last minute’.
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